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748 WEINER V. ROOF. [19 C. (2d) 
[L. A. No. 17299. In Bank. Mar. 5, 1942.] 
THEODORE WEINER, Appellant v. J. B. ROOF et al., De-
fendants; CITIZENS NATIONAL TRUST & SAVINGS 
BANK (a National Banking . Corporation) , Respondent. 
[1] Agency-Relation :Between Agent and Third Person....;.aesti-
tution-Ballk.-A bank which as trustee of a subdivision trust 
makes collections from purchasers of lots on behalf of its 
principals, whether designated an agent or trustee, is, as to 
money paid by . a purchaser who has been induced to sign a 
contract through fraud of a vendor, governed by the rule 
that one who has paid money through fraud or mistake to 
an innocent agent, may' recover the amount .trom the agent 
unless the latter has paid it to the prmcipal, spent it on behalf 
of the principal, or paid it to a third party on behalf of the 
principal. 
[2] ld.-Relation Between Agent and Third Person-Restttution-
Orediting Principal with Receipts.-An innocent agent who 
receives money through fraud is not relieved from his obliga" 
tion to make restitution to the person defrauded by reason 
of the fact that he credited the principal with the amount re-
ceived, so long as he continues to hold the money on behalf of 
the principal. 
[3a, 3b] ld.-Relation Between Agent and Third Person-Resti-
tution-Bank~-Where()a bank as trustee of a subdivision trust 
has credited amounts" received from a defrauded purchaser 
to an indebtedness owing to it by one of its principals with 
his consent, without knowledge at the time of the fraud, and 
where it holds the money in its private capacity, it is a bona 
fide purchaser for value and is entitled to retain the money. 
[4] ld.-Relation Between Agent and Third Person-Restitution-
Payment of Debt of Principal, Effect of.-If ali innocent agent 
receives money through fraud or mistake and pays it to a 
third party on behalf of his principal in payment of a debt 
owed the third party by the principal, the agent cannot be 
required to make restitution of the money. ' 
[6] Money Received-Defenses-Bona Fide Purchase.-If a per-
son receives money from another's agent in payment of a 
[1] See 1 Oal •. Jur. 689, 690; 215 Oal~Jur. W~, 122; 2 Am. Jur. 264. 
McK. Dig. Refeiences: [i~4,' 6] Agency, '§ 167; [5, 7] Money 
Received, § 18. . . . 
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debt owed to him by the principal, having no notice that the 
original owner of the money who paid it to the agent had a 
claim for restitution on the ground' of fraud or mistake, the 
receiver is a bona fide purchaser for value, and is entitled to 
retain the money as against. such original owner. Extinguish-
ment of the past indebtedness .by the receiver is considered 
a change of po.sition sufficient .to preclude a recovery from 
him, even though it would be possible for him to give up the 
money and retain his original claim against the debtor. 
[6J Agency-Relation Between Agent and Third Perso:!1-Restitu-
tion"";Agent as Oreditor.-If an innocent agent who receives 
money through fraud or mistake is a creditor of 1).is principal, 
and,with the latter's consent, applies the money received 
toward the payment· of the debt, he is a bona fide purchaser 
for vaJue and may retain the money as against the ,original 
owner. 
[7J Money Received - Defenses-Bona Fide Purchase-Value.-
Past indebtedness is sufficient value to justify one in retaining 
as against the original owner money received from a debtor 
who procured it by fraud or mistake, and the one receiving 
the money will not be left to his original claim against the debtor. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Thurmond Clarke, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action to rescind a contract of purchase, and for return of 
purchase money paid. Judgment on a second trial 'in favor of 
a trustee bank· defendant affirmed. 
I. Gralla and Henry O. Wackerbarth for Appellant. 
Chandler & Wright, John F. Gilbert and OliverS. North-
cote for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Joseph P. Connolly owned an 80-acre tract 
of unimproved land in Los ,Angeles, which he contracted to 
sell in 1927 to J. B. Roof, Incorporated,' for $5,500 an acre 
plus" one half the profits to be realized from the subdivision 
of the property and sale of the lots. To carry out the sale 
Connolly and J. B. Roof, Inc., set up a subdivision trust with 
the Farmers-and Merchants National Bank of Los Angeles as 
trustee. Under the terms of the trust, J.B. Roof, Il!C., was to 
subdivide the traetl construct street improvemonts/at its own 
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expense, and sell the lots. The trustee was to execute the con-
tracts of sale, make collectioIliS from the purchasers of the 
lots, pay to Connolly from these funds the amount owed him 
by J. B. Roof, Inc., for the land, and distribute the remainder 
to J. B. Roof,-Inc; In 1929 the Farmers and Merchants Na-
tional Bank assigned all its rights as trustee under the trust, 
including all previous contracts of purchase, to the Citizens 
National Trust and Savings Bank, and a new trust agree-
ment was entered into between Connolly, J. B. Roof, Inc., and 
the Citizens' Bank; Under the terms of this agreement the 
Citizens Bank, as trustee, held legal title to the property and 
made' collections from the purchasers of the lots. From funds 
thus collected' the. trustee could reimburse itself for advances 
to the trust. As the funds were received, a portion was allo-
cated to certain accounts for the payment of trust expenses, 
including fees and commissions of the trustee. Another por-
tion was allocated to an accOlUnt for payment of improve-
ments. Connolly then received payment on the amount owed 
him by J. B. Roof, Inc., as purchase price of the land, includ-
ing half the profits, and the remainder was paid to J. B. Roof, 
Inc. The trust recited that Connolly was indebted to the Citi-
zens Bank in the sum of $225,000 and authorized the bank to 
apply Connolly's share of the collections' as they were re-
ceived toward payment of this debt. The payments thus re-
ceived by the bank were treated as payments to Connolly of 
his share of the proceeds. . 
In 1927, the plaintiff, Theodore Weiner, was induced by 
J. B. Roof, Inc., to contract to 'purchase a lot for $3,500, and 
he began making payments to the trustee. Certain represen-
tations made by J. B. Roof, Inc., proved false. These repre-
sentations were not included in the written contract, which 
contained a clause limiting the responsibility of the seller to 
representations therein set forth. In 1932 plaintiff gave notice 
of rescission and brought suit against J. B. Roof, J. B. Roof, 
Inc., and the Citizens Bank to rescind the contract of pur-
chase because of fraud and to recover the money he had paid 
on the purchase price of the lot. He recovered a judgment 
against J. B. Roof and J. B. Roof, Inc., for $3,807.0l and 
against the bank for $1,890, the latter amount representing 
payments. plaintiff made to the bank after it became trustee. 
'rhe bank alone appealed from the judgment. On that appeal 
this court held that under the principle of Speck v. Wylie, 1 
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Cal. (2d) 625 [36 Pac. (2d) 618, 95 A. L. R. 760], plaintiff 
could reCOver payments made to the bank, but only to the 
extent that the bank was unjustly enriched thereby. The court 
stated that" appellant, as trustee of the money paid to it by 
respondent, should be afforded the opportunity of showing, as 
it asserts it can, that it has paid over to the beneficial owner 
the money for which judgment has been taken against it. 
Such a showing, if made, will disclose that the appellant, an 
innocent party to the fraud, has not been unjustly enriched 
and will preclude the entry of a monetary judgment against 
it under the rule mentioned." The judgment was reversed as 
to the bank, with the following instructions: "That portion 
of the judgment awarding plaintiff $1,890 as against the ap-
pellant Citizens National Trust and Savings Bank, as trus- . 
tee, is reversed, with directions to the court below to permit 
said appellant if it be so inclined, to offer evidence as to the 
disposition of the money paid to it by the respondent." 
(Weiner v. Roof, 10 Cal. (2d) 450 [74 Pac. (2d) 736J.) 
The evidence at the second trial was therefore confined to 
the disposition made by the bank of the money paid to it by 
plaintiff. The bank, by its accounts and the testimony of one 
of its officers, showed that in accordance with the terms of 
the trust it had disbursed' the $1,890 received from plaintiff 
as follows: $1,157.46 was credited to itself toward the pay-
ment of Connolly's indebtedness; $346.75 was credited to the 
general trust aMount, from which the general expenses of the 
truliJtwere paid, and $385.79 was credited to the improvement 
account, from which the cost of street improvements to the 
tract were paid. The bank showed that at the time of plain-
tiff's rescission the trust had paid out not only the funds in 
the various trust accounts but over $7,000 more advanced to 
it by the bank. On the basis of this evidence, the trial court 
found that the trustee had paid to the beneficial owners all 
the money it received from plaintiff, and rendered judgment 
l' for the bank. ' 
. [1] Plaintiff contends that the bank is liable for the 
money received by it because the money was never actually 
paid over to the beneficiaries. The bank, however, in making 
the collections from the purchasers of the lots in its capacity 
as trustee acted as agent on behalf of its principals, J. B. 
Roof, Inc;, and Connolly. The same rule governs the liability 
of the bank in such a situation whether it is designated a 
'., 
e 
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trustee or agent. (See Rest., Restitution, sees. 143 (a), (b), 190 
(a) ; Rest., Agency, sec. 13; 1 Cal. Jur. 689, 690; 25 Cal. Jur. 
121, 122; Weiner v. Roof, supra.) It is well settled that one 
who has paid money through fraud or mistake to an innocent 
agent, may recover the amount from the agent unless the lat-
ter has paid it to the principal, spent it on behalf of the prin-
cipal, or paid it to a third party on behalf of the principal. 
(Rest., Restitution, sec. 143 (b); Rest., !Agency, sec. 339 (f); 
Crocker-Woolworth Nat. Bank v. Nevada Bank, 139 Cal. 564 
(73 Pac. 456] ; Becsey v. California Title Ins. & Trust Co., 192 
Cal. 632 [221 Pac. 356] ; Craig v. Boone, 146 Cal. 718 [81 Pac. 
22] ; Weiner v. Roof, supra. See 2 C. J. 821-823.) 
[2] The fact that the agent credits the principal with the 
amount received does not release the agent from his obliga-
tion to make restitution so long as he continues to hold the 
money on behalf of the principal (Rest., Restitution, sec 143 
(b) ; Rest., Agency, sec. 339 (f); see National Bank of Calif· 
v. Miner, 167 Cal. 532 (140 Pac. 27] ; 2 C. J. 823) ; but when 
the agent parts with the money in accordance with theJl~ency, 
he is released from liability. In the present case the mere 
crediting of $346.75 and $385.79 to the general account and 
the improvement account respectively could not release the 
bank from the obligation to withdraw these sums from the 
accounts and repay them to plaintiff, but having actually ex-
pended the money on behalf of the trust, the beneficial own-
ers of which constitute its principal, it is no longer required 
to make restitution. [3a] Most of the money received by the bank from plaintiff, 
however, was applied on Connolly's indebtedness to it. It there-
fore still has that amount, not as trustee, but in its private ca-
pacity. [4] If an innocent agent receives money through 
mistake or fraud and pays it to a third party on behalf of his 
principal in payment of a debt owed the third party by the 
principal, the agent cannot be required to make restitution 
of the money. [5] If the third party has no notice of the 
claims of the original owner, he is a bona fide purchaser for 
value and may keep the amount as against the original owner" 
whose only remedy is against the principal on the grounds of 
fraud, mistake, or unjust enrichment. (Rest., Restitution, secs. 
13,172, 173(e) ; Rest., Trusts, sec. 304(2) (a) ; Frey v. Clifford, 
44 Cal. 335, 342; Davis v. Russell, 52 Cal. 611 (28 Am. Rep. 
647] ; Poorman v. Wallace, 75 Cal. 552 [17 Pac. 680] ; Vir-
ginia Timber & Lumber Co. v. Glenwood Lumber Co., 5 Cal. 
Mar. 1942.1 WEINER v. ROOF. 
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App. 256 [90 Pac. 48] ; Chapman v. Hughes, 134 Cal. 641, 658 
[58 Pac. 298, 60 Pac. 974, 66 Pac. 982]. See Cal. Civ. Code, 
secs. 1796, 3106.) Extinguishment· of the past indebtedness 
by the third party is considered a change of position sufficient 
to preclude a recovery from him even though it would bepos-
sible for him to give up the money and retain his original 
claim against the debtor. (See 21 Cal.L. Rev. 311 et seq.; 45 
Harv. L. Rev. 1333 et seq.; 33 Yale L. J. 628 etseq.; 2 Wil-
liston, Sales, (2d ed.) sec. 620.) 
[6] If the agent himself is the creditor of his principal, 
and with the latter's consent applies the money received to, 
ward the payment of the debt, he is likewise a bona fide pur-
chaser for value and may retain the money as against the 
original owner. (Rest., Restitution, sec. 143 (b) ; Rest., Agency, 
sec. 339(f); Bradley Lumber Co. v. Bradley County Bank, 
206 Fed. 41 [124 C. C. A. 175] ; White v. Rutherford, (Tex. 
Civ. App.) 148S. W. 598; Winslow v. Anderson, 78 N. H. 
478 [102 Atl. 310] ; La Farge v. Kneeland, 7 Cow. (N: Y.) 
456; Mowatt v. McLelan, (N. Y.) 1 Wend. 173; Langley v. 
Warner, 3 N. Y. 327; Cullen v. Donahue, 45 R. I. 237 [121 
Atl. 392] ; Holland v. Russell, (1861) 1 B. & S. 424, affmd. 
4 B. & S. 14; Taylor v. Metropolitan Ry., (1906) 2 K. B. 55; 
Bessler Movable Stairway Co. v. Bank of Leakesville, 140 
Miss. 537 [106 Pac. 445]; Hullet v. Cadick Milling Co., 90 
Ind. App. 271 [168 N. E. 610]. See 21 Cal. L. Rev. 311, 
324; 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1333, 1346; 2 C. J. 821-823.) The fact 
that the agent is the same person as the creditor and may keep 
the money himself in payment of the debt does not prejudice 
his right so long as the payment is authorized by the prin-
cipal. The legalefIect is the same as if the money were deliv. 
ered by the agent to the principal and then redelivered by 
the principal to the agent in payment· of the debt. Such for. 
malism, however, is unnecessary. In the words of the Restate, 
ment of Restitution, (section 143, comment b): "Where an 
agent receives money on account of the principal, the agent 
may, by agreement with the principal, apply such money upon 
an indebtedness of the principal to him. In this case the agent 
becomes a bona fide purchaser of the money and is entitled to 
keep it although paid to him by mistake .... The fact that 
upon making repayment to the payor, the fiduciary would 
himself be able to maintain an action against the beneficiarj' 
does not prevent the defense of change of position. This is 
true even though the beneficiary is available and has sufficient 
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assets to respond to a judgment for that amount; the remedy 
of the payor is against the beneficiary either directly or by 
subrogation." Thus in the present case the bank credited to 
itself, as authorized by the trust, some of the money received 
from plaintiff in payment of the indebtedness owed it by its 
principal. In its capacity as trustee it has paid out the money. 
In its private capacity it is a bona fide purchaser for value, 
entitled to retain the amount as against the plaintiff. 
There are decisions that require an innocent agent to make 
restitution of money received by fraud or mistake when he 
has applied the money toward the payment of a debt owed 
him by his principal. (Herlihy v. Independence State Bank, 
261 N. Y. 309 [185 N. E. 393] ; Alberta Pac. Grain Co. v. 
Dominion Bank, 55 Dom. L. R. 735; Nat'l Bank of Calif· v. 
Miner, supra.) These cases reason that the agent has not 
changed his position but has merely given the principal a 
credit, and that he may remove the credit upon giving up the 
money and retain his claim against the principal. The same 
argument would apply to any bona fide purchaser who has 
received money or property in payment of a past indebted-
ness from a debtor who procured it by fraud or mistake. [7] 
It is established in California, however, that a past indebted-
ness is sufficient value to justify the bona fide purchaser in 
retaining the money as against the original owner, and that 
the bona fide purchaser will not be left to his original claim 
against the debtor. (Frey v. Clifford, supra; Davis v. Rus-
sell, supra; Foorman v. Wallace, supra; Virginia Lumber Co. 
v. Glenwood Lumber Co., supra; Chapman v. Hughes, supra.) 
The d~cisions cited above requiring restitution are derived 
from the rule that an agent is required to restore money paid 
to him through mistake or fraud when he has credited his 
principal with the amount but still retains it in his posses-
sion. They fail to distinguish between an agent who holds 
the money on behalf of his principal after crediting it to the 
principal's account and an agent who has received the money, 
with the consent of the principal, in payment of a debt owed 
to him by the principal. In the latter situation the agent is 
in the position of a bona fide purchaser for value; in the for-
mer he is not. 
[3b] In the present case the bank applied the money re-
ceived from the plaintiff to the debt owed it by Connolly in ac-
cord with the terms of the trust and with Connolly's consent. It 
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had no knowledge of plaintiff's claim at the time it credited 
itself with the amount. In its capacity as agent it has there-
fore paid out plaintiff's money on behalf of its principal, and 
in its private capacity it is a bona fide purchaser for value, 
entitled to retain the money. 
This action is confined to the disposition made by the bank 
of the funds received by it from plaintiff. It is therefore 
irrelevant that the bank as trustee has subsequently received 
money for the trust from other purchasers of lots. Plaintiff 
has a judgment against J. B.Roof, Inc., one of the benefici-
aries under the trust, and may subject the interest of J. B. 
Roof, Inc., in the trust to levy and sale under execution. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J.,Edmonds, J., Houser, 
J., and Carter, J., concurred. 
[L. A. No. 17346. In Bank. Mar. 5, 1942.] 
G. C. DEGARMO, Respondent, v. A. GOLDMAN et a1., 
Appellants. 
[1] Actions - Classifications - Determination of Nature.-'In the 
determination of the character of an action as being legal or 
equitable for jurisdictional purposes,. the doctrine that the/ 
court should look to the historical basis of the plaintiff's right 
under the English law in the light of such modifications. as 
have taken place in this country is not always accurate. The 
equitable characteristics of the relief sought must be consid-
ered. (Philpott v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. (2d) 512 [36 Pac. 
(2d) 35, 95 A. L. R. 990] qualified.) 
[2] Corporations-Officers-Removal-Nature of Action.-A stat-
utory action by a stockholder or stockholders for the removal 
of corporate directors for misconduct, brought pursuant to 
MeR:. Dig. References: [1] Actions, § 13; [2-4, 8, 9] Corpora-
tions, § 554; [5-7] Equity, § 27; [10] Appeal and Error, § 407; 
[11, 12] Appeal and Error, § 922; [13] Appeal and Error, § 912. 
